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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The private corporation cannot be entrusted with the responsibil-
ity of maintaining and nurturing the rights of the individual. Part 
of the basis for the separation between the public and private enter-
prise is to protect the citizenry from the tyranny of both entities. 
When decision-making, planning and programming that were un-
der the auspices of the public government are transferred to the con-
trol of a private corporation, the city residents lose whatever re-
course they previously possessed to provide redress for their griev-
ances.1 
 In recent years, the rising cost of government has caused a debate 
over the advantages and disadvantages of privatizing government 
                                                                                                                      
 * The Author is an attorney practicing media law at Holland & Knight LLP in 
Jacksonville, Florida. Mr. Feiser obtained a J.D. and M.A. in Mass Communication from 
the University of Florida in 1998, and a B.A. in Journalism from Michigan State Univer-
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Brechner Center for Freedom of Information at the University of Florida, for his assistance 
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 1. Shirley L. Mays, Privatization of Municipal Services: A Contagion in the Body 
Politic, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 41, 68 (1995). 
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services. While some call privatization a panacea of efficiency, others 
worry about potential public sacrifices.2 Among these worries is the 
fear that unless access-to-information statutes can be extended to 
cover private entities, privatization will undermine the publics right 
to know.3 This is because most state statutes providing for freedom of 
access to government documents do not explicitly grant access to 
documents that are in the hands of private entities.4 Without legisla-
tive or judicial intervention interpreting these statutes broadly, most 
state governments could effectively transfer their documents into the 
hands of private companies and avoid the reach of freedom of infor-
mation acts.5 
 In most states, courts have engaged in statutory interpretation 
that allows the access statutes to reach private entities, at least in 
some circumstances.6 Courts have done this by interpreting the defi-
nitions of agency and agency records under their respective state 
statutes to encompass more than just records exclusively in the 
hands of traditional government entities.7 To varying degrees, the 
courts of most states have allowed government access statutes to 
reach private entities that are entangled with or somehow connected 
to the government.8 Whether any particular court grants access de-
pends on the extent to which a private entity needs to be connected 
with the government in order to be considered a public entity.9 
 Although the subtle meanings of statutory terms are often diffi-
cult to interpret, the interpretation of these terms has a major im-
pact on what information can be obtained by the press and the pub-
lic, particularly in an age of continued governmental privatization.10 
                                                                                                                      
 2. Compare id. with Joseph F. Caponio & Janet Geffner, Does Privatization Affect 
Access to Government Information?, 5 GOVT INFO. Q. 147 (1988) (stating that privatization 
of government functions can be an efficient management tool if used properly). 
 3. See, e.g., Matthew Bunker & Charles Davis, Privatized Government Functions and 
Freedom of Information: Public Accountability in an Age of Private Governance, 75 
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 464, 464-68 (1998). 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. It should be noted that state access laws are given several different names, such 
as freedom of information laws, public disclosure laws, public access laws, and public re-
cords acts. This Article will refer to each states act by its proper name when discussing 
that state. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See, e.g., Robert Rivas & J. Allison DeFoor II, When is a Private Document a Pub-
lic Record?, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1993, at 52. (discussing Florida cases in which private entities 
were subject to the Florida Public Records Act because of their connections to government).  
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. States like Texas, Florida, and Indiana have increasingly and aggressively pur-
sued privatization initiatives in order to save taxpayers money and to provide more effi-
cient services. However, these initiatives have not always been widely successful. See, e.g., 
Joan Thompson, Texas Faces Problem with Private Prisons Inmates Sent from Other States 
Can Evade Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 6, 1996, at 19A (giving the example of two 
Oregon prisoners who were sent to a privately run prison in Texas and, after escaping, 
could not be punished under Texas or Oregon law for the escape); Sunshine Law Is Going 
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As the desire for efficiency leads to continued privatization,11 it has 
been argued that the public will be increasingly shut out of opera-
tions that have traditionally been open to the public.12 Some com-
mentators say the courts must come forward and protect the publics 
right to know in the face of increasing private contracts for govern-
ment services.13 Because access laws in all fifty states are purely 
statutory, and most of these statutes do not explicitly reach private 
entities, it becomes a judicial matter to decide whether to hold pri-
vate contractors performing government services accountable to the 
public.14 In the absence of legislative amendment, courts are being 
forced to decide when access laws apply to these private entities per-
forming government functions.15 While some courts have provided 
clear guidance, others have made the standard less clear or failed to 
discuss the issue.16 
 The purpose of this Article is to analyze public access issues re-
lated to privatization and examine how state courts have dealt with 
requests for records from private entities performing government 
functions. These entities perform a wide range of services, from run-
ning prisons to operating dog-racing tracks.17 The thirty-four states 
whose court systems have dealt with the issue of privatization have 
employed different approaches to decide when access-to-information 
statutes should apply to private entities.18 Part II provides an over-
view of the scholarly debate over the pros and cons of privatization, 
as well as recent examples of the conflict between access laws and 
                                                                                                                      
to the Dogs, Some Say Proposal Would Privatize Rabies Vaccination Records, FLA. TODAY, 
Mar. 19, 1996, at 6B [hereinafter FLA. TODAY] (discussing some of the proposed changes to 
Floridas Sunshine Law, including one that would close pet vaccination records from public 
access); UNIV. OF FLA., FLORIDA SUNSHINE SUMMIT 10 (1997) [hereinafter FLA. SUNSHINE 
SUMMIT] (comments of Kyle Neiderpreum, Freedom of Information Chair, Society of Pro-
fessional Journalists, regarding unsuccessful privatization attempts in Indianapolis). 
 11. See, e.g., Bill Theobald, Public May Soon Get Access Boost; Online Computer 
Availability of City, County Records Might Be Increased When New Provider Firm Is Hired, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 28, 1997, at B6; FLA. SUNSHINE SUMMIT, supra note 10, at 10 
(comments of Jane Kirtley, Executive Director, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press, regarding increasing privatization of public hospitals). 
 12. See Bunker & Davis, supra note 3, at 5. 
 13. See generally Bunker & Davis, supra note 3. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See GARY W. BOWMAN ET. AL., PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 2 (1993); 
City of Dubuque v. Dubuque Racing Association, 420 N.W.2d 450, 451 (Iowa 1988). 
 18. The issue of the application of access laws to private entities has not yet reached 
the highest court level in many of these states. See infra Part III. The sixteen states that 
have not taken up the issue in the court system are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Is-
land, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. Some of the courts in these states 
have been presented with access cases involving private entities, but have provided no dis-
cussion on the reach of access statutes because the entitys private status was not the cen-
tral issue of the litigation. These cases are not included in this Articles analysis. 
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privatization. Part II follows with an analysis of the various state 
court approaches. Part III then compares the different approaches. A 
categorization scheme for the approaches sheds light on which states 
provide for easier access to government information in the hands of 
private entities. 
 This Article is meant to be a guide for the media law practitioner, 
as well as the media professional, in determining which states are 
most likely to provide access to information in private hands and 
what types of entities are most likely to be subject to access laws. It 
explains that some states have more flexible standards than others 
for determining what falls within statutory definitions of agency 
and agency records, tipping the balance in favor of access in most 
situations. This Article refers to these approaches as flexible be-
cause courts using these approaches consider more than one factor in 
deciding whether to grant access.19 These flexible approaches can be 
compared to those of other state courts that only allow access to 
documents in private hands under more specific, restrictive circum-
stances. Usually, the more restrictive courts deny access because 
they are constrained to a greater extent by explicit statutory defini-
tions of what constitutes an agency or an agency record.20 
 This Article groups the approaches together to provide a useful 
categorization of the thirty-four states that explicitly handle the pri-
vatization issue. Although each state court system takes a slightly 
distinctive approach to the private entity issue, there are some simi-
larities among different states approaches. Additionally, there is no 
specific private entity that will always be subject to public access; it 
depends on the application of each states test, some of which are 
more confined to explicit statutory definitions than others. 
 This Article does not suggest that there are categories of specific 
private entities (such as all volunteer fire departments or all in-
surance departments) that will always be subject to access laws. 
Nevertheless, while it has been suggested that privatization has ob-
vious benefits,21 an informed discussion should include all of the pos-
sible impacts. This Article suggests that before leaping into privati-
zation, both legal professionals and the public need to be aware of the 
impact privatization will have on their participation in the process of 
government. 
                                                                                                                      
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See, e.g., Phil Hampton, Privatization Has Value, Candidates Agree; Caution 
Urged by Contenders, PRESS-ENTER. (Riverside, Cal.), March 11, 1996, at B1 (noting that 
privatization advocates contend that the private sector is more efficient and can operate at 
lower costs than government). 
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II.   PRIVATIZATION AND THE DEBATE OVER PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
 Privatization can take many forms. The most common form of pri-
vatization, called contracting out,22 happens when the government 
contracts with a private entity to provide a service previously per-
formed by the government, or to provide a service for or on behalf of a 
government entity.23 Services such as fire protection, transportation, 
jails, and health care have been delegated to private entities, and 
litigation over access to records formerly maintained by the govern-
ment has erupted. The debate over the value of privatization and its 
impact on public access laws centers around this contracting out 
form of privatization.24 
 As governments continue to have difficult financial times,25 con-
tracting out has become a widely considered option. Its success, how-
ever, has been mixed. For example, in 1996 the City of Indianapolis 
contracted with Ameritech to provide online computer access to many 
of the citys public records. Although both the city and the private 
company were initially enthusiastic about more efficient and inex-
pensive access to records,26 in the end the venture proved unsuccess-
ful. This was primarily because Ameritech found that the cost of the 
venture was too high; the result was a higher cost of access than if 
the records had been in the hands of government.27 Consequently, 
Ameritech announced in June 1997 that it would not seek to renew 
its contract, which expired in 1998.28 Even so, the city plans to seek 
out another contractor to provide the online services, because offi-
cials believe that privatization can be more efficient if done in an ef-
fective way.29 
                                                                                                                      
 22. See Mays, supra note 1, at 43. 
 23. See id.; see also Bunker & Davis, supra note 3, at 7-8. 
 24. A less common form of privatization is called load shedding, which occurs when 
a government sells its public facility to a private entity or completely privatizes a portion of 
traditionally public services. See Mays, supra note 1, at 44. It has been pointed out that 
governments are free to contract out public services, and true load shedding does occur in 
some cases. See id. However, the majority of cases involve a government entity contracting 
with a private entity to provide a service to the public. 
 25. See Mays, supra note 1, at 42 (discussing the financial woes of city governments). 
 26. See Jim Beck, City Gets Proposal To Put Records Online, EVANSVILLE COURIER, 
Mar. 28, 1996, at 5A (announcing the discussions between the city and Ameritech). 
 27. See FLA. SUNSHINE SUMMIT, supra note 10, at 10 (comments of Kyle Neider-
preum). Neiderpreum, who is also a reporter for the Indianapolis Star, said Ameritech 
wanted the records to be a money-maker, but the online service fell below its expectations. 
See id. Additionally, concern was expressed over the rising price of the records under the 
new system, even though their value was enhanced by computer access. See id.; see also 
Rebecca Buckman, Computer Retrieval of Records a New Wrinkle in Public Access, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 21, 1994, at A1 (discussing the prohibitive costs of subscribing to 
an online public records access service). 
 28. See Theobald, supra note 11. 
 29. See id. In fact, the city is looking to expand the online services to include property 
tax records, land records, and traffic accident reports. The government still perceives that 
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 Privatization has continued even in the face of difficulties because 
governments still believe there are benefits to contracting out certain 
government services.30 In Arizona and Texas, governments have 
found it financially beneficial to contract out the operation of state 
prisons.31 In Ohio, independent firms have screened candidates for 
big-city police jobs, shielding the process from public access by claim-
ing they do not fall under the state access law.32 In Illinois, the state 
press association fought to maintain public access when a judge al-
lowed Ameritech and its CivicLink project to manage all court re-
cords.33 Members of the media from all over the state of Illinois be-
came alarmed when they realized that CivicLink would have exclu-
sive control of all the records within the first seventy-two hours of ex-
istence before disbursing the information to the public.34 As with 
Ameritechs efforts to manage documents in Indianapolis and Prince 
Georges County, Maryland, members of the Illinois press worried 
that this privatization effort would effectively cut off their rights to 
free and open access.35 
 Even though it has detractors, advocates of privatization have 
continued to push for more contracting out to private entities. Since 
the late 1980s, privatization of services has gained ground as local 
governments have competed with private companies to see which can 
provide the services in a more efficient and cost-effective manner.36 
                                                                                                                      
computer access could be more efficient and cost-effective, as well as more convenient for 
the public, even though Ameritech wanted to focus its efforts in another direction. Id. 
 30. In fact, one of the most ardent supporters of access to government information, 
Jane Kirtley, has also acknowledged that privatization can possibly be a success because it 
could make access to government information cheaper and more efficient. See FLA. 
SUNSHINE SUMMIT, supra note 10, at 10. However, Kirtley stressed the need for a mecha-
nism to ensure that the public can get records at the same or lower cost than when the 
government was the vendor, which did not happen in the Indianapolis case. See id.; see 
also Louis Uchitelle, Competition Called Key to Success with Privatization, ORANGE 
COUNTY (CAL.) REG., Apr. 26, 1988, at A6 (stating that competition can force private agen-
cies to bid for services at a lower cost than the government could provide them, helping to 
realize the efficiency and cost benefits of privatization); Thompson, supra note 10 (discuss-
ing the problems Texas has faced in its efforts to privatize the states prisons). 
 31. See Barbara Croll Fought, Privatization Threatens Access, QUILL, Sept. 1997, at 8. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. These records were to be stored electronically and then sold to the public 
for profit. 
 34. See id. The media successfully won their battle with CivicLink when county clerks 
began refusing to sign exclusive contracts with CivicLink, and eventually legislators 
banned future contracts. See id. at 9. As of late 1997, Ameritech said it was abandoning 
the CivicLink project, and other large information vendors belonging to the Information 
Industry Association have stated that they do not favor exclusive agreements to manage 
information. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See Uchitelle, supra note 30. Uchitelle mentions jails and fire departments in 
Florida and garbage collection in Phoenix, Arizona, as examples of services whcih the gov-
ernment and private companies were bidding against each other to provide. See id. In some 
cases the government won the bidding war, but in others, such as a jail in Bay County, 
Florida, a private corporation took over the services. See id. Uchitelle also gives examples 
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Todays advocates of privatization stress the importance of careful 
study for determining which services would benefit from privatiza-
tion based on a cost-benefit perspective.37  
 Studies of the benefits of privatization have continued as cities 
experience financial troubles. For example, in 1996 the City of At-
lanta, even with its expected revenue from the Olympics, still consid-
ered privatization in the face of what was called poor fiscal health.38 
In Miami, the city did not want to lose the revenue generated by the 
Miami Heat basketball team, so it recruited a local businessman to 
facilitate talks with the team, a move that had the effect of shielding 
the entire deal-making process from the public.39 The businessman 
refused to grant public access to the records dealing directly with 
public funds and bonds, even though such records would obviously 
have been public had the government itself conducted the negotia-
tions. Thus, the Miami government was able to privatize a specific 
service, even though it related directly to taxpayer money. In so do-
                                                                                                                      
of services, such as data processing, vehicle maintenance, street-light repair, hospital 
management, and park maintenance, that have come under increasing privatization. See 
id. In short, Uchitelle makes clear that during the Reagan years, competition was seen as 
the key to more cost-efficient services, as governments were wasting money and finishing 
fiscal years in the red. See id. Even so, lost in the debate were the effects on public access 
to records previously held by the government. 
 37. See Hampton, supra note 21. Hampton points out that in 1996, candidates for 
county supervisor in Riverside County, California, were pushing for continued privatiza-
tion efforts, mentioning hospitals, jails, data processing, bill collecting, and street sweeping 
as viable areas for privatization. See id. Even though research into the viable areas has 
been stressed, advocates of privatization have still called for massive privatization be-
cause they still perceive that the profit-motivated private sector is more efficient than the 
government. Id. Hampton points out that the country farms out millions of dollars to pri-
vate companies to provide services, and entire units of government have been shut down 
with a resulting loss of government jobs. Id. Based on this information, it appears that pri-
vatization is not a fading remnant of the Reagan era, but is still going strong as govern-
ments seek to rid themselves of public costs. 
 In fact, in the age of the Information Superhighway, local governments say they simply 
cannot afford to put public records online and manage them; therefore private vendors are 
a necessity. See Fought, supra note 31, at 10. These privatization efforts have a profit goal 
as well, with one government in California bringing in as much as $400,000 per year. See 
id. Such private computerized databases are resulting in higher fees for public access, as 
the public now has to pay for the computers, software, upgrades, and employee time in ac-
cessing the records. See id. This has led members of the media to stress that while putting 
records online is commendable because of easier access, it should not result in higher fees 
for records that have already been paid for by the public. See id. 
 38. See Darryl Fears, Suggestion of Privatization Opens Gap in Atlanta Politics, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 4, 1996, at 2C. In fact, a Rotary Club member said the citys 
fiscal health was so bad that it was nearing collapse. Id. The member offered a simple 
solution for what he called the citys bloated employee rolls and sluggish services: contract 
work currently handled by the city to private companies. Id. 
 39. See Fought, supra note 31, at 11. The businessman who refused to grant the me-
dia access to the records surrounding the new deal with the Miami Heat was P. Anthony 
Ridder, chairman and CEO of Knight-Ridder, Inc., owner of the Miami Herald. See id. The 
Miami New Times eventually sued Ridder and obtained access to the files, but the judge 
never ruled on whether Ridder was subject to public access, even though he was helping to 
create records relating directly to public business. See id. 
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ing, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the city temporarily 
shielded a deal-making process involving public money from public 
scrutiny. Other areas in Florida and Indiana have also contracted 
out services in the face of fiscal difficulties, providing further evi-
dence that privatization is far from a dying phenomenon.40 
 Although it is still going strong, privatization is not without its 
share of detractors. Some commentators have argued that privatiza-
tion hurts the public sector and employees because unlike govern-
ment, private entities are not subject to constitutional limitations.41 
Government employees are also arguing against privatization be-
cause they say it hurts their ability to negotiate employment con-
tracts, limits the governments oversight of vital public programs, 
causes layoffs, and in fact insults the quality of their work by sug-
gesting they are not efficient.42 Others have suggested that the priva-
tization process carries risks of contract disputes and government 
overcharges, hurts the status of labor unions, and reduces wages and 
benefits, while divesting the taxpayer of former public benefits; crit-
ics further complain that the issue is over-politicized.43 Still others 
claim that any cost savings from privatization are minimal at best 
and are outweighed by the loss in oversight that goes with privatiza-
tion.44 Minorities and elderly citizens also worry that the private sec-
tor will neglect the increasing commitment government has shown to 
                                                                                                                      
 40. For example, again in Indianapolis, a health department performing a supple-
mental government function has been formed by the city as a private agency with no sub-
stantial links to the government. See FLA. SUNSHINE SUMMIT, supra note 10, at 11 (com-
ments of Kyle Neiderpreum). It has been pointed out that two Florida counties have privat-
ized their jails. See id. (comments of attorney Pat Anderson). Additionally, Dade County, 
Florida developed a Geographic Information System (GIS) digital land database and then 
allowed Florida Power and Light to acquire the copyright, giving the county half the prof-
its. See Fought, supra note 31, at 9.  
 One newspaper editor in Miami fears that this exclusive copyright can prevent public ac-
cess to the mapping information. See FLA. SUNSHINE SUMMIT, supra note 10, at 5 (com-
ments of Dan Keating, Research and Technology Editor, Miami Herald). Joel Campbell, 
Vice President of the National Freedom of Information Coalition, has pointed out that pri-
vate companies are selling government records in states such as Utah, Idaho and Nevada, 
just to name a few. See id.; see also Fought, supra note 31 (providing several examples of 
traditional government functions now being performed by private entities). 
 41. See, e.g., Mays, supra note 1, at 45. Mays cites the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process requirements as an example. See id. In order for such requirements to apply to the 
private sector, the author points out that a state action approach must be found by the 
courts. Id. at 45-46. 
 42. See Hampton, supra note 21. 
 43. See Elizabeth Moore, Doling Out Services, NEWSDAY, Apr. 15, 1996, at C1. Moore 
provides a good overview of privatization issues and examples in the State of New York 
and the rest of the nation, actually calling privatization a worldwide movement. Id. Re-
cent successes and failures of privatization are highlighted, with an eye toward the future 
as Gov. George Pataki of New York seeks to employ a commission to help farm out an in-
creasing number of state services and buildings to private entities. See id.; see also Hamp-
ton, supra note 21; Uchitelle, supra note 30 (giving similar examples). 
 44. See id.; see also Hampton, supra note 21 (suggesting that some privatized services 
are still too risky when compared to minimal benefits gained, such as law enforcement). 
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hiring African Americans and retaining older Americans.45 Lastly, 
privatization critics worry that private companies will become waste-
ful and ineffective in providing important public services.46 
 Although the debate over privatization has raged since the 1980s, 
only in the 1990s have media professionals made their voices heard 
over the potential impact on the watchdog role of the media and the 
publics right to know.47 Members of the media have realized that be-
cause most freedom of information laws do not explicitly reach pri-
vate entities, the entities may refuse to release previously public in-
formation, or at least force the media or the public to engage in costly 
litigation.48 
 Privatization may be desirable in itself, but it should not come 
without statutory or contractual provisions leaving public account-
ability intact.49 Not only should the public be able to monitor the pri-
vate companys activities, but the monitoring should be on the same 
terms as when the public agency was the information vendor.50 
                                                                                                                      
 45. See Uchitelle, supra note 30; see also Fears, supra note 38. 
 46. See Fears, supra note 38. It has been suggested that this wastefulness comes from 
increased spending and higher fees charged by private entities. See id. Fears cites a pri-
vate health care company in Georgia that billed the state for such things as luxury cars 
and jets. See id. In an attempt to solve the wastefulness problem, it has been suggested 
that contract requirements for quarterly reports could be built into privatization agree-
ments. See id. 
 47. See, e.g., Elliot Krieger, Privatization Raises Issues of Accountability, PROVIDENCE 
J.-BULL., Dec. 15, 1996, at 7B. 
 48. See id. The Article discusses the refusal by private companies to release informa-
tion because they do not believe they are accountable under access laws, citing the welfare 
system in Wisconsin as an example of a private company that has been determining eligi-
bility standards in that state. One critic of the privatization of the Wisconsin system 
stated, And if you dont know what those standards are, if you have no access to the wel-
fare requirements, then how can you monitor? Id. (quoting Bill Kovach, curator of the 
Nieman Foundation at Harvard University). 
 49. See, e.g., Staff Editorial, Private Contracts: Armbrister Bill Would Provide Greater 
Public Access, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Apr. 29, 1997, at A18. The editorial argues that a 
proposed bill making contracts between private companies and public agencies, totaling at 
least $1 million, a matter of public record does not go far enoughit should include all con-
tracts. See id. 
 50. See, e.g., David Poulson, Bill May Ensure Public Tracks Spending, GRAND RAPIDS 
PRESS, Apr. 1, 1996, at C3. One example the article gives is charging fees for copying 
documents. Although government agencies frequently waived fees for small copying jobs, 
the article states that one private company has charged a $17-per-hour labor fee for small 
jobs. See id. Fearing that private companies waste money and raise costs (as in the Indian-
apolis case), one Michigan legislator has proposed a bill that would allow the public to 
track private spending under public contracts. See id. 
 In answering the concerns about public oversight of private companies performing public 
functions, some have suggested that the most common way to ensure this would be to in-
clude a provision in contracts that requires the private company to abide by the states 
freedom of information laws. See Buckman, supra note 27. Additionally, the public could 
gain access to such records by requesting that the public body obtain them from the private 
entity on its own behalf, a right most governments retain when they contract out services. 
See id. Critics are not comforted by these arguments, claiming that the government has 
nonetheless failed to monitor private firms on behalf of the public. See id. (citing the exam-
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 Members of the media have claimed that fears of substantially re-
duced access to information from private companies have become a 
reality; thus, state legislatures need to solve the problem.51 Numer-
ous examples have been given where, the media claim, once-public 
information has disappeared behind the curtain of corporate pri-
vacy.52 Press members say they have been denied access to tax col-
lection records, prisons, health data, and even the states compiled 
laws.53 Additionally, private entities have been successful in gaining 
legislative exemptions from open records laws in order to nullify any 
claim that the public should have access.54 In reaction, the media has 
been active in seeking support for public-access bills in states such as 
Michigan, Texas, and Connecticut to ensure that records in the 
hands of private entities remain open to the public.55 
 While little attention was given to access issues in the 1980s when 
privatization first began to gain ground, scholars have begun to take 
notice of freedom of information problems in the 1990s. For example, 
Professors Matthew Bunker and Charles Davis have pointed out that 
by creating, maintaining, and controlling previously public records, 
private companies are controlling access, and that they are often at 
odds with the very purpose of public records laws.56 Citing several 
disputes between private companies and the public seeking records, 
the authors state that such disputes likely represent a growing 
trend.57 
 Consequently, it is necessary for the courts to clarify the role of 
public-records laws in the face of growing privatization, because state 
statutory definitions have been inadequate and the legislatures have 
not implemented changes.58 This clarification is especially relevant 
due to continued privatization not only across many types of services, 
but within specific public institutions as they privatize food services, 
                                                                                                                      
ple of the City of Indianapolis failure to monitor a private company that did not seek pub-
lic bids for construction projects after assuming operation of a municipal golf course). 
 51. See Staff Editorial, supra note 49; Don Noel, Privatization Shouldnt Reduce 
Public Information, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 16, 1997, at A11. 
 52. Noel, supra note 51 (discussing privatization contracts in Connecticut). 
 53. See id. The article again stresses that the more common trend is not to deny total 
access to information, but to instead allow access at a marked-up price. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., FLA. TODAY, supra note 10 (discussing the successful move by veterinari-
ans to seal off pet records from the public). 
 55. See Noel, supra note 51 (stating that public scrutiny is necessary to ensure that 
the process remains on the straight and narrow, and discussing a Connecticut bill con-
taining provisions to ensure that information in private hands remains open to the public); 
Poulson, supra note 50; Staff Editorial, supra note 49. 
 56. Bunker & Davis, supra note 3, at 5. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. at 6. While the authors point out that state statutes and judicial decisions 
do not adequately deal with the problem of privatization and freedom of information, they 
do not discuss the decisions of all 50 states in great detail or analyze the potential impact 
of court approaches. This Article provides such an analysis. See infra Part III. 
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health care, and other services.59 In response to arguments concern-
ing the benefits of privatization (efficiency and competition), Bunker 
and Davis suggest that state courts take a public function approach 
under which private entities performing a formerly public function 
would remain accountable under the freedom of information laws.60 
 In short, privatization raises a number of issues that have gained 
prominence as public bodies continue to turn to privatization as an 
option in the late 1990s. Whatever the arguments for or against pri-
vatization, it is obvious that as long as some legislatures remain si-
lent on the issue, state courts will face decisions that require balanc-
ing the arguments and staying in tune with the spirit of the access 
laws. All fifty states have enacted access laws, but overwhelmingly 
their legislatures have not accounted for the privatization trend. 
Therefore, the courts must tackle the issue in the absence of statu-
tory amendments. The next section will show that how readily the in-
formation flows depends on where in the country a person makes a 
request, and who makes the request. 
III.   STATE COURTS AND PRIVATE ENTITIES SUBJECT TO ACCESS LAWS 
 Critics have argued that state courts have not effectively handled 
the privatization issue and how it affects public access under freedom 
of information statutes.61 Few courts have actually dealt with the is-
sue of complete privatization, instead handling cases in which gov-
ernments have delegated certain powers to private entities.62 How-
ever, courts in thirty-four states have rendered decisions interpreting 
when a private entity is a public agency under freedom of informa-
                                                                                                                      
 59. See, e.g., Carol DeMare, Corrections Chief Pans Private Prisons, TIMES UNION (Al-
bany, N.Y.), June 3, 1997, at B1 (discussing a speech by New York State Corrections 
Commissioner Glenn Goord in which he stated that private prison companies are only mo-
tivated by profit and that the state can do an equally cost-effective job of corrections); Nick 
Gillespie, Accountability Ensures Justice for Private Prisons, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Sept. 29, 
1997, at 6B (discussing abuses by private prison guards that have resulted in government 
cancellation of contracts, and stating that these economic consequences can prevent pri-
vate companies from providing inadequate services); Prison Privatization Is No Panacea, 
HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 24, 1997, at C2 (also discussing abuse of inmates by guards in 
private prisons, and inferring that such abuses could not be discovered absent protection 
under freedom of information laws); Thompson, supra note 10 (stating that 18 states have 
private prisons, with Texas and Florida leading the pack in terms of the number of private 
beds). 
 Accountability and public access to privatized federal prisons has also been a concern in 
recent years, with commentators arguing that private prison operations and records should 
be declared public under the Federal Freedom of Information Act. See generally Nicole B. 
Casarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Corrections: The 
Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249 (1995). 
 60. See Bunker & Davis, supra note 3, at 24; see also FLA. SUNSHINE SUMMIT, supra 
note 10 (comments of Jane Kirtley stating that privatization can work if it is ensured that 
private companies remain subject to freedom of information laws). 
 61. See Bunker & Davis, supra note 3, at 13-14. 
 62. See id. 
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tion statutes and when the entitys records are agency records.63 
These decisions have ranged from flexible, access-favoring applica-
tions of freedom of information statutes to more restrictive, access-
limiting applications due to more explicit definitions found within 
the statutes themselves. 
 Classifying into two groups the various approaches the states use 
in determining when a private entity is subject to access laws is a dif-
ficult task. The terms flexible and restrictive are not always per-
fectly descriptive, as sometimes a court using a flexible approach de-
nies access to records because of the absence of numerous factors 
which would signal the public nature of the entity or records. On the 
other hand, restrictive approaches sometimes allow access to docu-
ments if a determinative factor is present. 
 Under the flexible approaches, courts do not limit access to cases 
in which a single determining factor is present, such as public fund-
ing or day-to-day control by government. Instead, the flexible courts 
review a variety of factors and do not pigeonhole access based on the 
presence, or absence, of one single, determining factor. In contrast, 
courts in the restrictive categories only allow access to private enti-
ties in cases where a specific factor is present, such as a certain level 
of public funding or control by government. These courts do not look 
at multiple factors, but instead use this approach, primarily because 
they must work with more explicit definitions of agency and 
agency records under their state access laws, which limit judicial 
discretion to cases where a certain factor is present. 
A.   The Flexible Approaches Favoring Access 
 Twenty-two states courts that have discussed the issues of priva-
tization and when a private entity is subject to freedom of informa-
tion laws can be classified as flexible. The three sub-approaches 
used by the states in this section can be called the totality of factors 
approach, the public function approach, and the nature of records 
approach. Each of these approaches is described below. 
                                                                                                                      
 63. Bunker and Davis state, [T]he issue [of privatization] has arisen in relatively few 
cases, and most jurisdictions have not addressed it. Id. at 13. However, the authors were 
probably referring to pure privatization that results when governments completely turn 
over an operation. See id. at 13-14. This author found that 34 states have in fact handed 
down public access decisions affecting private entities and the public, even though some 
may not involve pure, large-scale privatization. Many of the cases cited in this section ac-
tually deal with the delegation of power to private entities, an issue Bunker and Davis say 
has arisen in a handful of cases. See id. at 13. This Article does not attempt to exten-
sively differentiate between the factual types of privatization, instead opting to focus on 
the way courts have dealt with people seeking information from private entities. Arguably, 
the test used by a court can determine when access will be granted, and differing facts 
can produce a different outcome. 
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1.   The Totality of Factors Approach: Connecticut, Florida, 
Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon, and Kansas  
 This sub-approach can be classified as flexible because the six 
states using it look at a number of factors to determine if a private 
entity should be subject to freedom of information laws. One factor 
alone will not suffice to grant access, but neither will the absence of 
one factor suffice to deny it. Connecticut was the first state to de-
velop this approach. In Connecticut Humane Society v. Freedom of In-
formation Commission,64 the Connecticut Supreme Court explained 
that in order for a private entity to be subject to the state Freedom of 
Information Act, it must be the functional equivalent of a public 
agency.65 Deciding whether an entity is the functional equivalent of 
a public agency involves considering a number of factors, including: 
1)  Whether the entity performs a governmental function; 
2)  The level of government funding; 
3)  The extent of government involvement or regulation; and 
4)  Whether the entity was created by the government.66 
 The court stressed that no one factor is determinative, and that 
all relevant factors need to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.67 For 
instance, it was pointed out that a private entity could be a public 
agency under state law even without government funding.68 Applying 
this totality of factors test, the court still held that the Humane Soci-
ety was not a public agency, in part because there was no govern-
ment funding (even though the Society was created by government 
charter).69 The Society was not required to undertake certain activi-
ties that it was authorized by statute to undertake (there was little 
real regulation), and the government did not control the Society or 
review its activities.70 While the court was willing to take a close look 
at the exact nature of the private entity to determine if it should be 
subject to access laws, it recognized that one factor could not be de-
terminative in either direction, and that the absence of enough fac-
tors would prevent a private entity from being subject to the state 
Freedom of Information Act.71 
                                                                                                                      
 64. 591 A.2d 395, 397 (Conn. 1991). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. at 398-99.  
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. The functional equivalent perspective utilizing a number of factors was 
first used in Connecticut in 1980 in Board of Trustees of Woodstock Academy v. Freedom of 
Information Commission, 436 A.2d 266, 270-271 (Conn. 1980). In that case, the facts 
tipped the balance in favor of finding that the Woodstock Academy, which provided public 
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 Recent Connecticut appellate court opinions have addressed a 
number of factors under the functional equivalence test for determin-
ing when an agency should be open to the public. In Domestic Vio-
lence Services v. Freedom of Information Commission,72 the Appellate 
Court of Connecticut held that a domestic violence services organiza-
tion was not a public agency under the states Freedom of Informa-
tion Act because most of the indicia of functional equivalence to gov-
ernment were not present.73 The government did not create the or-
ganization, it had no power to govern or to make decisions or regula-
tions, and it was not controlled by the government.74 Thus, the or-
ganization was not the functional equivalent of the government, even 
though it received more than half of its funding from government en-
tities, it was subject to government audit and contract, and the gov-
ernment had a direct and growing interest in the prevention of do-
mestic violence.75 The court decided the organization could not be 
considered the functional equivalent of state government because it 
was not subject to the type of direct, pervasive or continuous regula-
tory control necessary to create the equivalent of a government 
agency.76 
                                                                                                                      
education supported by public funds and regulated by the state, was a public agency under 
the state Freedom of Information Act. See id. at 271. In Woodstock Academy, the func-
tional test factors used by the Humane Society court were set out for the first time, but 
the latter court offered a more detailed discussion of how the test should be applied in the 
future. See Connecticut Humane Socy, 591 A.2d at 397-99. The court in Woodstock Acad-
emy did point out that a truly private entity would not be subject to the Freedom of In-
formation Act, and the Humane Society case provides a good example of what the court 
would consider a truly private entityone where a majority of the factors are not present. 
See Woodstock Academy, 436 A.2d at 271; see also Connecticut Humane Socy, 591 A.2d at 
399. 
 72. 704 A.2d 827 (Conn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 73. See id. at 829.  
 74. See id. at 830-33. 
 75. See id. at 830-34. The court stressed that [t]he key to determining whether an en-
tity is a government agency or merely a contractor with the government is whether the 
government is really involved in the core of the program. Id. at 832 (quoting Forsham v. 
Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1978) affd, 445 U.S. 169 (1978)). Because the gov-
ernment in this case merely contracted with the organization and left it the bulk of control 
over the services, the organization could not be considered the equivalent of government. 
See id. 
 76. Id. at 833 (quoting Hallas v. Freedom of Info. Commn, 557 A.2d 568 (Conn. Ct. 
App. 1989)); cf. Town of Windham v. Freedom of Info. Commn, 711 A.2d 738 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 1998); David v. Freedom of Info. Commn, No. CV 970395384, 1998 WL 83685 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1998). In Windham, the court held that affidavits prepared and used by a pri-
vate attorney to defend the town were not public records because they were never used by 
the city or admitted into evidence, but were instead used only privately by the attorney. 
See Windham, 711 A.2d at 741. Thus, none of the control factors that would make the 
documents public were present. See id. 
 In determining that the New Haven Community Television Company was not a public 
agency under the Act, the David court also found that none of the factors for functional 
equivalence were present, since the company only controlled educational and governmental 
channels, functions that were reserved for the media and were not government functions. 
See David, 1998 WL 83685, at *2. Additionally, the company was primarily funded through 
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 The Florida courts have been even more detailed in their applica-
tion of a totality of factors or functional equivalent approach. The 
seminal case in determining when a private entity will be subject to 
the state public records law is News and Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, 
Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group, Inc.77 In that case, the Florida 
Supreme Court took the Connecticut approach a step further, listing 
nine factors78 that can be used to determine if a private corporation is 
acting on behalf of any public agency under the public records 
law:79 
1)  The level of public funding; 
2)  Commingling of funds; 
3)  Whether the activity was conducted on publicly owned prop-
erty; 
4)  Whether services contracted for are an integral part of the pub-
lic agencys chosen decision-making process; 
5)  Whether the private entity is performing a governmental func-
tion or a function which the public agency otherwise would per-
form; 
6)  The extent of the public agencys involvement with, regulation 
of, or control over the private entity; 
7)  Whether the private entity was created by the public agency; 
8)  Whether the public agency has a substantial financial interest 
in the private entity; and 
9)  For whose benefit the private entity is functioning.80 
 Applying this totality of factors test, the court held that the archi-
tectural company was not acting on behalf of any public agency 
when it was hired by the county to perform professional architectural 
services for the construction of a school.81 Nonetheless, the court 
                                                                                                                      
private monies, and although it was subject to government regulations, the amount of day-
to-day government control was very limited. See id. at *2-3. In short, none of the tradi-
tional factors that would make the company the functional equivalent of government were 
present in the David case. See id.  
 77. 596 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1992). 
 78. Id. at 1031. The court stated that the test is not limited to these factors, and oth-
ers may be used as well. See id. 
 79. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(2) (1995). The language acting on behalf of any public 
agency is never defined in the statute, leaving the courts discretion in their interpretation 
of what constitutes an agency. Schwab, 596 So. 2d at 1031 (reciting the definition given 
to the term by Florida courts). 
 80. Schwab, 596 So. 2d at 1031. 
 81. Id. at 1031. This was because the firm was not created by the school board, public 
funds were only given for services rendered, the school board did not control the firm or 
delegate any part of its decision-making processes to the firm, the firm did not perform a 
school board function or operate for the benefit of the firm, and the school board did not 
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stressed that it was taking a flexible and cautious approach by using 
a broad definition of agency, which would ensure that a public 
agency could not avoid disclosure under Florida law by contractually 
delegating its responsibility to a private entity.82 
 The Schwab courts totality of factors approach was essentially a 
codification of many factors previously used by Florida District 
Courts of Appeal to determine when a private entity should be sub-
ject to Floridas public records law.83 Since the Schwab decision, Flor-
ida courts have emphasized that one factor alone will not be deter-
minative, and that private entities must actually be delegated some 
sort of public function.84 But if the private entity is doing more than 
just providing a specific, contracted-for service to the public agency, 
the private entity is likely to be subject to Floridas access law. This 
is because when the entity is taking over some public role, a number 
of the factors spelled out in Schwab are likely to be present. 
 For example, in News-Journal Corp. v. Memorial Hospital-West 
Volusia, Inc.,85 it was held that a lessee running a hospital on behalf 
of a public authority responsible for public services was a public 
                                                                                                                      
perform a government function. See id. at 1032. Thus, the totality of factors test was not 
met because none of the factors were present. 
 82. See id. at 1031. 
 83. See, e.g., Booksmart Enters., Inc. v. Barnes & Noble College Bookstores, Inc., 718 
So.2d 227 (Fla. 3rd. DCA 1998) (finding that forms connected with the universitys selec-
tion of textbooks were public records because they were prepared on behalf of a public 
agency, the university); Sarasota Herald-Tribune Co. v. Community Health Corp., 582 So. 
2d 730, 731-734 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1991) (holding that a private health corporation was act-
ing on behalf of the county board under the public records law where it was created and 
existed for the purpose of serving the public, the county could influence decision making 
through sitting on the corporations board, the county was set to get funds from the corpo-
ration upon its dissolution, and public funds were provided to the corporation); Parsons & 
Whittemore, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 429 So. 2d 343, 346 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983) 
(finding that engineering and construction firms merely entered into business contracts 
with the county to perform services, without performing any governmental function or par-
ticipating in any decision-making process); Schwartzman v. Merritt Island Volunteer Fire 
Dept, 352 So. 2d 1230, 1231-32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (holding that a nonprofit, volunteer 
fire department was acting on behalf of a public agency because it was completely en-
trusted with fire protection, was operating on county property, and was funded in part by 
public monies).  
 See also Robert Rivas & J. Allison DeFoor II, When Is a Private Document a Public Re-
cord?, 67 FLA. B.J. 52 (1993), for a brief analysis of several pre-Schwab Florida cases and 
how they fit together to determine when a private entity may be subject to Floridas public 
records law. Rivas and DeFoor recognize the flexible approach of Florida courts by discuss-
ing the large number of private entities that could find their records subject to access, stat-
ing, A surprisingly broad range of lawyers should familiarize themselves with the sub-
ject. Id. 
 84. See, e.g., Harold v. Orange County, 668 So. 2d 1010, 1011-12 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) 
(finding that a private entity acting as a construction manager for a countys civic center 
project was a public entity, because although a private entity can contract with the county 
for services and not be subject to the access law, here the entity had a public obligation to 
perform a function for the county and to maintain and disclose records to a public body). 
 85. 695 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), affd, 729 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1999). 
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agency under Florida law.86 The Fifth District Court of Appeal stated 
that an entity that merely contracts with a public agency to provide 
specific services or goods to help the public entity perform its func-
tion may not necessarily be subject to the open records law. However, 
once an entity relieves a public body of one of its functions and uses 
public equipment and funds to perform that function, it becomes sub-
ject to the public records law.87 Providing a public service that bene-
fits the public and using the publics investment to do so are thus the 
critical factors.88 
 The Florida Supreme Court recently affirmed News-Journal,89 
holding that when the West Volusia Hospital Authority in Deland 
awarded a forty-year lease to Memorial Health Systems, a private 
corporation, open government mandates were not changed; therefore, 
reporters must be allowed to attend hospital meetings.90 The Court 
agreed with the district court of appeal that the totality of factors 
test mandated by the Schwab decision indicated that when the gov-
ernment transferred the responsibilities of a public health authority 
to a private entity, the states sunshine requirements should con-
tinue to apply to that entity.91 By transferring its publicly mandated 
responsibilities over the operation and maintenance of county hospi-
tals, the county government was essentially deputizing a private cor-
poration to act for the publics health and thus the totality of factors 
test weighed in favor of maintaining public access.92 
                                                                                                                      
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. at 420. It should be noted that in addition to statutory law, the Florida 
Constitution contains a provision for access to government, stating that one has the right 
to review records of any public body or persons acting on their behalf. FLA. CONST. art I, 
§ 24. Essentially, Article I makes it impossible for the legislature to unilaterally end Flor-
idas tradition of openness, but the News-Journal and other courts have not signaled that 
the presence of a constitutional provision warrants any differing degree of analysis. 
 88. See News-Journal, 695 So. 2d at 420. The News-Journal court based its decision 
on the facts that the authority had created the private lessee, the private lessee was oper-
ating on public property with the help of taxation, its funds were commingled with public 
funds, the public authority had decision-making authority over the private company, and 
the private entity was performing a function previously performed by a public body. See id. 
at 421-22; see also Stanfield v. Salvation Army, 695 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (find-
ing that a private organization providing misdemeanor probation services for the county 
was a public agency because it provided services previously provided by the county); Sip-
kema v. Reedy Creek Improvement Dist., 697 So. 2d 880, 881 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (Harris, 
J., concurring) (finding that a private security company was not acting on behalf of a 
county when it simply heightened security on its own property, was not funded or created 
by the county, and was not controlled by the county in any way). 
 89. Memorial Hospital-West Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corp., 729 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 
1999), affg 695 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). 
 90. See id. at 379-84. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. In a concurrent decision, the Florida Supreme Court also held that an ex-
emption allowing public health boards to meet in private for certain strategic plan opera-
tions was unconstitutionally overbroad, as the exemption did not define strategic plan or 
properly limit the definition to critical confidential information. See Halifax Hosp. Med. 
Ctr. v. News-Journal Corp., 724 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1999); see also Private Managers of Public 
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 However, it has been argued that even after Schwab public access 
law in Florida is still in a state of confusion. For example, one com-
mentator suggested that Schwab significantly narrowed the defini-
tion of public agency under Florida law, limiting public access even 
to records held by entities assisted by public funds.93 The commenta-
tor suggested that the totality of factors test was incorrectly applied 
in the Schwab case, arguing that, instead, the architectural firm was 
clearly the functional equivalent of a public agency. Thus, it was act-
ing on behalf of the government in implementing the school boards 
decisions and by fulfilling a professional responsibility of the board.94 
 To decide whether the private entity is acting on behalf of a pub-
lic agency, Robinson states it is only necessary to determine whether 
its records were created in connection with the transaction of official 
business.95 Ultimately, if the entity is acting for the benefit of a pub-
lic agency, the applicable records would clearly be connected to the 
transaction of public business based on the content of the records, not 
the nature of the entity.96 Nonetheless, although the totality of fac-
tors test has been termed too restrictive, it is actually more flexible 
than tests used by other states because of its focus on a number of 
factors (with no one factor determinative). It provides a balancing 
approach that weighs the facts and interests involved in each case.97 
 Three other state courts have adopted approaches analogous to 
the totality of factors approach of Connecticut and Florida. In Abell 
Publishing Co. v. Mezzanote,98 the Maryland Court of Appeals held 
that an insurance guaranty association was an agency or instru-
mentality under the Maryland Public Information Act.99 This hold-
ing was based on a number of factors, including the interrelationship 
between the government and private entity, the public purpose of the 
                                                                                                                      
Hospitals Are Subject to State Sunshine Laws, 23 NEWS MEDIA & L. 21 (1999). In other 
words, the Florida Supreme Court would not allow an end-run around sunshine laws 
through a broadly worded exemption. 
 93. See Marguerite L. Robinson, Detectives Following the Wrong Clues: Identification 
of Private Entities Subject to Floridas Public Records Law, 22 STETSON L. REV. 785 (1993). 
 94. Id. at 808-811 (arguing that the architectural firm was obviously acting on behalf 
of the school board because the board was answerable for the firms actions). 
 95. Id. at 812 (emphasis omitted). 
 96. See id. This would be a very broad approach, because it would make any record 
pertaining to public business an accessible record. See id. at 814-815. Five states do take a 
nature of records approach similar to the authors suggested approach. See infra Part 
III.C. 
 97. See Charles A. Carlson, Stepping into the Sunshine: Application of the Florida 
Public Records Act to Private Entities, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1993, at 71 (arguing that private 
firms with close relationships to public agencies have broad obligations to comply with 
the public records law, which could hurt the private entity that has to turn over informa-
tion to its competitors). Carlson states that the totality of factors test determining whether 
a private entity acts on behalf of a public agency does accommodate conflicting interests 
and is thus warranted, even if it is an unpredictable, case-by-case approach. See id. at 74. 
 98. 464 A.2d 1068 (Md. 1983). 
 99. See id. at 1072-74. 
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private entity, the degree of government control (lack of independ-
ence of the private entity), creation of the entity by statute, and the 
entitys immunity from tort liability.100  
 Similarly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has held that a 
nonprofit county hospital system must release terms of legal settle-
ments because of county commission control, review, and regulation; 
public funding; operation on leased county property; and operation 
pursuant to county agreement and bonds.101 Although the hospital 
authority had independent authority to govern itself, it was still de-
fined as an agency under North Carolina law because the court felt 
its independence did not overwhelm the countys control.102 The 
North Carolina court reasoned that corporate entities can be gov-
ernment agencies when they are delegated public functions, particu-
larly when a number of factors showing the government nature of the 
entity and its records are present.103 Like the other courts using the 
totality of factors approach, the North Carolina and Maryland courts 
considered many factors without making any one factor determina-
tive of public access. 
 The Oregon Supreme Court also adopted a totality of factors ap-
proach when it denied parents access to the records of a fact-finding 
team appointed by the school district to investigate problems at the 
local high school.104 The fact-finding team was held not to be a public 
body based on the courts analysis of a number of factors: The entity 
originated from the school board, its function was related to a public 
bodys operation, its scope of authority was narrow, it lacked public 
funding, it was subject to little control or decision-making authority 
by the school board and, aside from a few of its board members, it 
was independent of the school board.105 Because the investigative 
team was independent of government and not able to make the 
boards decisions, the court held that the factors weighed in favor of 
finding the team not subject to the Kansas Inspection of Public Re-
cords Law.106 
                                                                                                                      
 100. See id. at 1072-74. 
 101. See News and Observer Publg Co. v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 284 S.E.2d 
542, 544-49 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981). 
 102. See id. at 547. 
 103. See id. at 548-549. As stated above, the court reiterated these factors: the countys 
responsibility to supervise and control the system; the countys approval of new board 
members; the transfer of funds to the county on the systems dissolution; the county lease; 
the county bond financing of the system; and the countys supervision over the systems 
corporate existence. See id. 
 104. See Marks v. McKenzie High School Fact-Finding Team, 878 P.2d 417 (Or. 1994). 
 105. See id. at 424-25. 
 106. See id. at 426. It could be argued that the court in Marks was more restrictive in 
applying the totality of factors approach, essentially requiring the private entity to be a 
functional equivalent of government for it to be subject to access. However, the totality of 
factors approach should still be considered flexible because it allows the courts to weigh a 
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 Lastly, the Kansas Attorney General has also adopted a totality of 
factors approach, although not binding on the States courts. The At-
torney General ruled that the Kansas Turnpike Authority was a pub-
lic instrumentality with the authority to perform an essential public 
function and was therefore subject to Kansas Open Meetings and 
Open Records Acts.107 The Attorney General used four main factors to 
determine if the entity was an agency under the Acts: whether the 
entity has authority to make government decisions; whether the en-
tity has independent authority in the exercise of its functions; 
whether the entity is subject to government supervision and audits; 
and whether the entity accomplishes public ends.108 Additionally, the 
opinion stressed the public funding of the entity and subordination to 
a state political or taxing subdivision as factors to consider.109 In the 
Turnpike case, the Authority was an arm of the state created by the 
legislature to perform an essential government function, and it re-
ceived and expended public funds.110 Like the other cases applying 
the totality of factors approach, the Kansas opinion discussed the 
importance of interpreting the meaning of public agency broadly 
absent more specific legislative definitions, refusing to turn away ac-
cess based on the presence or absence of one single factor.111 
2.   The Public Function Approach: Georgia, New York, Ohio, 
California, Louisiana, Missouri, Utah, Kentucky, Delaware, and 
New Hampshire 
 This approach, used by ten states, focuses less on a factorial test 
and more on whether an entity is performing a public function. Al-
though the Georgia Supreme Court has not yet taken up the privati-
zation issue, the most in-depth discussion of this approach came from 
the Georgia Court of Appeals in Hackworth v. Board of Education.112 
In this case, a television station sought the personnel records of 
school bus drivers employed by a private company providing a service 
for the school district.113 Georgias public records statute covered 
items received or maintained by a private entity on behalf of a pub-
                                                                                                                      
number of factors to determine which ones tip the balance in either direction, without one 
factor being determinative. See id. at 421 n.7, 424-25. 
 107. See 27 Kan. Op. Atty Gen. 47 (1993), 1993 WL 467822, at *1. 
 108. See id. at *2. 
 109. See id. at *3-4. 
 110. See id. The Attorney General seemed to place great emphasis on the public fund-
ing issue because it was spelled out in the Kansas definition of public agency; however, 
the Attorney General still proceeded to lay out other factors in determining that the open 
meetings and records acts applied in the instant case. Id. 
 111. See id. at *4.  
 112. 447 S.E.2d 78 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). 
 113. See id. 
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lic office or agency.114 However, rather than interpreting this provi-
sion to require a totality of factors analysis, the Hackworth court 
stated conclusively that because the school boards responsibility in-
cluded the hiring of bus drivers, which required personnel records as 
an integral part of this responsibility, the records at issue were pub-
lic records, even though the board delegated its responsibility to a 
private entity.115 If the private entity is performing a legitimate func-
tion of the public entity, it will be subject to the Georgia access law.116 
This approach asks what function is performed by the private entity, 
rather than posing questions about such issues as control or funding. 
The purpose of the state act cannot be frustrated by allowing a public 
entity to delegate its responsibility to a private entity and conse-
quently to escape the law.117 The Hackworth court was more inter-
ested in looking at what function the private entity was performing 
than in enquiring into the entitys specific form.118 
 New York uses an approach similar to Georgias to determine 
when a private entity is subject to the states freedom of information 
law. The New York Court of Appeals first discussed the states 
broad definition of records in Encore College Bookstores, Inc. v. Aux-
iliary Service Corp.119 There, the Court of Appeals held that a book-
list maintained by an auxiliary service corporation of the state uni-
versity had to be turned over to a private bookstore because it was 
kept or held by a public agency under the states Freedom of In-
formation Law.120 Similar to the Georgia approach, the New York 
Court of Appeals favored a broad access approach, making the re-
cords accessible because the service corporation was created for the 
                                                                                                                      
 114. Id. at 80. Like Florida, the Georgia Legislature had not provided specifics for this 
on behalf of language. 
 115. See id. at 80-81. 
 116. See id. at 81. 
 117. See id. at 82. 
 118. Georgia courts have re-emphasized this public function approach in recent years 
by pointing out that the lack of other characteristicssuch as public fundingis irrelevant 
as long as the entity is performing a public function. See, e.g., Northwest Ga. Health Sys., 
Inc. v. Times-Journal, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 297, 299-300 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the 
defendant hospital associations were subject to the open records and meetings laws, even 
though neither received substantial tax support, since they were formed to provide care for 
the general public, entered into a lease with a public agency, and agreed to operate the 
hospital for the public good, thus becoming the vehicle through which the public hospital 
authorities carried out their official duties); Clayton County Hosp. Auth. v. Webb, 430 
S.E.2d 89, 92-93 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that public records include items received 
and maintained by a private person or entity acting on behalf of a public agency, where 
corporate affiliates were created as part of the Hospital Authoritys reorganization, assets 
of the Authority were transferred to the affiliates, and the Authority had control of re-
cords.). The Webb court emphasized that the entities functioned under the direction and 
control of the Authority to implement the Authoritys duty to provide for public health.). 
Id. at 93. 
 119. 663 N.E.2d 302, 305 (N.Y. 1995). 
 120. See id. at 306. 
846  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:825 
 
benefit of a public university.121 Because the booklist was kept by the 
corporation for a public agency, the corporation was performing a 
public function and the record was a public record, regardless of the 
purpose for which it had been created, the function to which it re-
lated, or whether it was in the possession of the public agency.122 The 
court took an expansive approach to defining public agency and 
public record under state law, stating that as long as the record 
was kept for a public agency, a private entity performing a public 
function was subject to disclosure regardless of other factual circum-
stances.123 
 The Ohio courts have taken a public function approach similar to 
New Yorks. In State ex rel. Gannett Satellite Information Network v. 
Shirey,124 the Ohio Supreme Court, construing that states Public Re-
cords Act broadly in favor of access, held that contracting out cannot 
alter the citys duty to provide access to public documents.125 When a 
public official contracts with a private entity for assistance in filling 
a public position, it does not matter if the agency is independent of 
government as long as it is hired to perform a public function.126 
Thus, when the city manager hired a private consultant to assist in 
hiring, the private consultant had to turn over application documents 
to the newspaper.127 The court emphasized that regardless of its 
characteristics, the private entity was performing a public function 
and that a public agency cannot circumvent its access obligations by 
contracting to a third party.128 In short, the Ohio court took an ex-
pansive approach similar to New Yorks in holding that as long as 
the entity is performing a public function for the benefit of a public 
office, it will be subject to the Public Records Act.129 
                                                                                                                      
 121. See id. at 305. 
 122. See id. at 305-06. 
 123. See id.; cf. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Insurance Dept of N.Y., 532 N.Y.S.2d 186, 
188-89 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding that the liquidation bureau of the state insurance 
department was not an agency subject to the states freedom of information law since even 
though an agency includes a government entity performing a function for the state, the 
bureau served private policy holders and was substantially independent from the state). 
The court in Consolidated Edison seemed to focus on a number of factual factors in deter-
mining that the bureau was not an agency under the law, but it stressed that the term 
agency should mean any entity acting on behalf of the state to carry out a public benefit. 
See id. at 189. Thus, the case is not really in conflict with Encores broad approach. 
 124. 678 N.E.2d 557 (Ohio 1997). 
 125. See id. at 559-60. 
 126. See id. at 560-61. 
 127. See id. at 561. 
 128. See id. (finding that government entities cannot conceal information by contract-
ing out uniquely public duties to a private entity). 
 129. See id.; see also State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. University of Toledo Found., 602 
N.E.2d 1159 (Ohio 1992) (finding that a nonprofit corporation that had solicited and re-
ceived donations for a public university was a public office subject to disclosure law, since 
it acted as a major soliciting arm of the university and received support from public taxa-
tion). The Toledo Blade court pointed out that the entity exercised an essential function of 
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 In a recent decision, the Ohio Supreme Court held in State ex rel. 
Freedom Communications, Inc. v. Elida Community Fire Co.130 that a 
community fire company was a public office under the state public 
records law, even though it was a privately run, nonprofit organiza-
tion.131 This was because the company was organized to provide ser-
vice to the public, it was supported by public tax funds, and it was 
performing a function historically performed by the government.132 
These factors essentially made the fire company a public agency be-
cause it was performing a function that the government would oth-
erwise perform.133 
 In California, the lower courts have basically adopted the public 
function test. Once the public entity delegates its duty to provide a 
public service to a private entity, the private entity is likely to be-
come responsible under Californias Public Records Act. In San 
Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court,134 the court held that the privately 
generated financial data relied on by the city in granting a rate in-
crease to a private waste disposal company was a public record.135 
The court ignored the private companys independence because the 
city had a contractual relationship with the company and the com-
pany was providing a public service for the city.136 Similar to the 
courts in Georgia, New York, and Ohio, the court in California was 
less concerned with specific attributes of the private entity and more 
concerned with the function it was performing. 
 Another state that focuses on the function performed by the pri-
vate entity is Louisiana. In State ex rel. Guste v. Nicholls College 
Foundation,137 the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the public na-
ture of the funds received by the nonprofit corporation, but it also 
reasoned that a public body under Louisiana law should include 
                                                                                                                      
government, even if it was not supported by public money, and thus it had no isolated, in-
dependent existence. See id.; see also State ex rel. Strothers v. Wertheim, 684 N.E.2d 1239, 
1241 (Ohio 1997) (holding a county citizens ombudsman office, a private, nonprofit corpo-
ration, to be a public office because it was supported by public funds and established for 
the purpose of serving the public, thus performing a public function in partnership with 
the county government); State ex rel. Fox v. Cuyahoga County Hosp. Sys., 529 N.E.2d 443, 
444-45 (Ohio 1988) (holding that a hospital rendering services to county residents and 
supported by county funds was performing a public function and was therefore a public of-
fice). 
 130. 697 N.E.2d 210 (Ohio 1998). 
 131. Id. at 212. 
 132. See id. at 212-13. 
 133. See id.; see also State ex rel. Findlay Publg Co. v. Hancock County Bd. of 
Commrs, 684 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (Ohio 1997) (holding that government entities cannot 
conceal records by delegating a duty to a private entity, because such an entity essentially 
assumes the role of government for purposes of the statute). 
 134. 192 Cal. Rptr. 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
 135. See id. at 422. The California Supreme Court has not decided what a public en-
tity is. 
 136. See id. at 417, 422. 
 137. 564 So. 2d 682 (La. 1990). 
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any public or quasi-public nonprofit corporation designated as an 
entity to perform a governmental or proprietary function.138 Because 
the private entity in that case, a university alumni foundation, re-
ceived public funds, promoted the university, and had a close affilia-
tion with the university, it was a quasi-public nonprofit corporation 
performing functions of the college.139 In short, the Louisiana Court 
followed the public function approach by holding that once an entity 
takes on public duties, it becomes subject to access. 
 The Missouri Supreme Court also adopted a form of the public 
function approach when it held that a St. Louis board of estimate 
and apportionment was a public governmental body, even though it 
was not created by statute or the state constitution.140 The court 
made this decision because the board was created by the city to per-
form vital government functions, such as the collection of public 
funds, preparation of the budget, and taxation.141 It was a public body 
subject to access because it was charged with performing essential 
public functions.142 
 The Utah Supreme Court adopted a public function approach by 
looking at the nature, purpose, and functions of Utahs state bar 
association and holding that it was not a public office or state 
agency under the states access law, even though it was created by 
the Utah Supreme Court.143 Official creation or recognition by state 
statute did not turn the bar into a public agency, because it only pro-
vided specialized professional advice and did not participate in the 
general government of the State.144 Providing services to practicing 
lawyers and advising the state supreme court did not make the bar 
subject to the access law, because it was not performing a public 
function of a public agency, and it had no final decision-making au-
thority.145 Additionally, it had many nongovernmental attributes 
that weighed against its having a public function, such as independ-
ence from the state, liability for taxes and lawsuits, private employ-
ees, and private membership.146 
                                                                                                                      
 138. Id. at 685. 
 139. See id. at 687. 
 140. Cohen v. Poelker, 520 S.W.2d 50, 52-53 (Mo. 1975). 
 141. See id. at 52. 
 142. Although the board in Cohen was not a private entity in the true sense, the ap-
proach of the Missouri Supreme Court nonetheless signals an endorsement of the public 
function approach that could likely turn some private entities into government bodies 
under Missouri law. 
 143. Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 804 P.2d 526, 529 (Utah 1991). 
 144. Id. (quoting Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 11 (1990)). 
 145. Id. at 529-530. 
 146. See id. at 530. This is a difficult case because the state bar at issue is arguably 
performing a public function similar to the entities in previous cases, even though it has 
no final decision-making authority. However, the court apparently adopted a somewhat 
more narrow public function approach in this case than in previous cases by requiring 
some participation in government or decision-making authority. See id. at 529. 
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 The Kentucky Court of Appeals recently held in Kentucky Central 
Life Insurance Co. v. Park Broadcasting of Kentucky, Inc.147 that nei-
ther an insolvent insurance company nor a court-appointed rehabili-
tator were public agencies as defined under the Kentucky Open Re-
cords Act.148 This decision was made because the rehabilitator occu-
pied and performed a separate role from his duties as the regulator of 
the states insurance department, and he did not perform a public 
function when he simply stepped into the shoes of a private insur-
ance company.149 The court held that a public agency subject to ac-
cess meant an entity created to perform a government function, and 
that protecting insureds and creditors was not traditionally a gov-
ernment function.150 
 Lastly, two other states appear to follow a version of the public 
function approach. The Delaware Supreme Court has held that when 
an authority performs essential public functions, it is a public agency 
partly because it is specifically charged . . . to advise or make rec-
ommendations for a government entity under Delaware law.151 How-
ever, the court seemed to base its decision at least partially on the 
fact that the solid waste authority at issue received about $800,000 
in public funds.152 In addition to performing a public function, the au-
thority was also supported by and expending public funds.153 This 
approach by the Delaware Supreme Court is basically a hybrid pub-
lic function approach because the court did not make clear whether it 
                                                                                                                      
 147. 913 S.W.2d 330 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. at 334-35. 
 150. See id. at 335. The court also seemed to acknowledge other factors present in the 
case, including government control, financial involvement of the government, and the 
status of the entitys employees. See id. These factors helped the court conclude that the 
rehabilitator was not functioning as a unit of government because he essentially stepped 
into the shoes of the leaders of a private insurance company. Id. at 335. Arguably, the fac-
tors seem to suggest that the court was looking at a more narrow version of the public 
function approachan approach focusing on the functional equivalence of the agency in 
question. It is unclear what the court would do in a different case, because here the court 
found that the rehabilitator was not performing any public function. However, two years 
earlier, the Kentucky Attorney General had suggested that: 
A contractor to a governmental entity . . . must accept certain necessary conse-
quences of involvement in public affairs. Such a contractor, whether a corpora-
tion or an individual human being, runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than 
might otherwise be the case. Such a contractor, in our view, loses any character 
of a private individual. 
94 Ky. Op. Atty Gen. 27, 1994 WL 109053, at *1, *4 (1994) (quoting earlier opinions). 
While recognizing the trend toward privatization, the Attorney General stated that private 
providers become publicly accountable and subject to public access. See id. 
 151. Delaware Solid Waste Auth. v. News-Journal Co., 480 A.2d 628, 632-33 (Del. 
1984). 
 152. See id. at 630. Additionally, the solid waste authority was created by statute to 
develop a state-wide solid waste plan, and it had hired state employees. See id. at 629, 632-
33. 
 153. See id. at 629-30. The public funds approach can be characterized as a more 
restrictive approach limiting access to one determinative factor. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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would hold that a private entity is subject to access solely on the ba-
sis of its performance of a public function, or whether public funding 
would be necessary. 
 New Hampshires approach is also similar to the public function 
approach, but it is difficult to fit into a category. In Bradbury v. 
Shaw,154 the New Hampshire Supreme Court granted access to the 
meetings and records of a mayors industrial advisory committee.155 
The committee worked for the city, and it was subject to New Hamp-
shires Right to Know Law even though it was not created by stat-
ute.156 It was subject to the law because it performed a public func-
tion. However, the courts future approach remained unclear because 
it stressed that [n]ot all organizations that work for or with the gov-
ernment are subject to the right-to-know law.157 Like Delaware, New 
Hampshires approach appears to fall under the public function cate-
gory, but its future application remains ambiguous. This approach, 
by focusing on an entitys function, provides more flexibility than re-
quiring specific factors such as funding, because the function test 
makes specific features of the entity or record irrelevant as long as 
the entity is functioning for the public. 
3.   The Nature of Records Approach: Colorado, Maine, 
Minnesota, Montana, Washington, and Wisconsin 
 The third flexible approach can be called the nature of records 
approach. The six states following this approach focus on the public 
or private nature of the records involved, as opposed to focusing on 
the function and makeup of the private entity itself. For example, 
one Colorado court used this approach when it held that a baseball 
stadium owner was liable under Colorados Open Records Act be-
cause the documents in the owners possession were used by a public 
stadium district in the exercise of its official functions.158 In essence, 
the records were public because they were writings made, main-
                                                                                                                      
 154. 360 A.2d 123 (N.H. 1976), superseded by statute as stated in Voelbel v. Bridge-
water, 667 A.2d 1028. 1029 (N.H. 1995). The statute superseding this case does not alter 
the approach taken by the court in regard to public access to information in the hands of 
private entities. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. at 124-25. 
 157. Id. at 125. A recent Supreme Court of New Hampshire decision also suggests that 
a public function approach is to be used under the state access law. In Union Leader 
Corp. v. New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority, 705 A.2d 725 (N.H. 1997), the court 
held that a housing finance authority was subject to the states Right-to-Know law because 
it was acting as a public instrumentality operating to perform essential government 
functions. Id. at 731. However, the entity in Union Leader was not a purely private entity 
as it was subject to state control and funding. As a result, it remains somewhat unclear 
what the court would do if faced with a purely private entity. 
 158. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 68 v. Denver Metro. Major League 
Baseball Stadium Dist., 880 P.2d 160, 164 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). 
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tained, or kept by the . . . [public] agency . . . for use in the exercise of 
[its official] functions, regardless of the fact that they were not in 
the public agencys actual personal custody or control.159 The private 
contractor maintained the documents for the Stadium District, and 
the District used them to select an electrical subcontractor for its 
public stadium project.160 In short, the documents contents were the 
focus, and since they contained public information, regardless of the 
entity that actually held them, they were subject to public access. 
 Following an approach similar to Colorados, one Maine court has 
followed the nature of records approach. In Bangor Publishing Co. v. 
University of Maine System,161 the Maine Superior Court ordered a 
university system to release documents relating to the financial 
terms of employee settlements because, it held, public records must 
be construed broadly to include more than just records in the actual 
possession of a public agency.162 The court ruled that public records 
also include anything relating to the transaction of public business, 
regardless of literal possession or the attributes of the entity holding 
the records.163 In other words, the records were public because they 
were held for a public entity and related to public business; therefore, 
the university could not evade the law by placing public documents 
in private hands.164 
 A court in Minnesota has also held that actual physical possession 
by a public entity is not required for a record to be considered public 
under the states access law, as long as the record has a public pur-
pose. The Minnesota Court of Appeals stated in Pathmanathan v. St. 
Cloud University,165 that because the government had a contract with 
the private investigator, all of the documents in his possession were 
public even though they were not in the universitys actual posses-
sion.166 As long as the documents and data were created or main-
                                                                                                                      
 159. Id. at 164; see also COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-202(2) (1988) (defining official cus-
todian as a party responsible for public records, regardless of whether they have actual 
custody or control). 
 160. International Bhd., 880 P.2d at 164. The court emphasized that records do not 
have to be in the actual possession of a public agency in order to be public records, as long 
as the records are public in nature and used for a public purpose, they are public regard-
less of the entity that is in actual possession. See id. In other words, the records them-
selves are the primary focus of the Colorado Court of Appeals, rather than the characteris-
tics of the entity or physical possession. 
 161. 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1792, 1795 (Me. Super. Ct. 1995). 
 162. See id. at 1794-95. 
 163. See id. at 1793-94. The Maine statute defined public records as those in actual 
possession . . . of [a state] agency . . . or contain[ing] information relating to . . . govern-
ment business. See id. at 1793 (quoting the statute). This provision gave the court the 
statutory window it needed to apply the nature of records approach, as opposed to the 
more restrictive possession approach described in Part III.B.3, infra. 
 164. See id. at 1794. 
 165. 461 N.W.2d 726 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 166. See id. at 728. 
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tained for public purposes, they were public regardless of the nature 
of the entity in possession.167 In short, the court adopted the flexible 
approach of allowing public access to records when the records have 
some government purpose, finding little relevance in the identity of 
the actual possessor or its characteristics. 
 In Montana, where a constitutional provision protects the publics 
right to know,168 the Montana Supreme Court ruled that a school dis-
trict was not required to provide records relating to a students ad-
mission to the National Honor Society because the records were not 
documents . . . of . . . public bodies under the right-to-know law.169 
The court focused on the nature of the documents themselves, rea-
soning that they were produced by an independent private organiza-
tion with no information regarding school matters or employee is-
sues.170 They were simply assessment records filed voluntarily by 
teachers with a private organization outside of the teachers job re-
quirements.171 In fact, the school district itself had no records per-
taining to the National Honor Society, thus the records had no gov-
ernment purpose.172 But the court adopted the nature of records ap-
proach when it suggested that records relating to a government pur-
pose would be subject to the right-to-know provision in Montanas 
Constitution.173 
 Finally, Washington and Wisconsin courts of appeals have also 
adopted a version of the nature of records approach. In Washington, 
the Court of Appeals held that a private contractors records filed 
with city government pursuant to contract were public because they 
contained information relating to the . . . performance of a [govern-
ment] function, the rehabilitation of the citys sewer system, under 
the Washington Public Disclosure Act.174 This was true regardless of 
the characteristics of the entity involved (in contrast to the public 
function approach described above), or the entity in actual posses-
sion. Similarly, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that a memo-
randum of understanding regarding a lawsuit settlement was a pub-
                                                                                                                      
 167. See id. 
 168. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9. 
 169. Becky v. Butte-Silver Bow Sch. Dist. No. 1, 906 P.2d 193, 195-96 (Mont. 1995). 
 170. See id. at 197. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id.; see also Worden v. Montana Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 962 P.2d 1157 
(Mont. 1998) In Worden, the Montana Supreme Court held that the term documents of 
public bodies as used in the Montana Constitution and state statutes meant documents 
related to the function and duties of a public body. Although the court did not have the 
documents of inmates to determine their subject matter, it nonetheless held the documents 
to be public because they were maintained and used by a public body. Id. at 1162. Thus, 
presumably the nature of the records would relate to the function of the boards of pardon 
and parole, both of which are public bodies. See id. 
 174. Laborers Intl Union Local No. 374 v. City of Aberdeen, 642 P.2d 418, 420 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1982). 
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lic record even though a private attorney prepared the memoran-
dum.175 Because the memorandum played a significant role in the 
settlement process, it was presumed open since it was held for a pub-
lic authority under the state public records law.176 The court fo-
cused on the nature of the record by stating that a public entity could 
not avoid access by delegating the records creation and custody to an 
agent.177 The record would be treated as if it had been retained by the 
school board itself, with little attention given to the attributes of the 
entity holding the record.178 
 The three approaches highlighted in this section represent flexible 
standards taken by twenty-two states in determining whether a pri-
vate entity will be subject to the various state access laws. These ap-
proaches are flexible because they show the willingness of courts to 
scrutinize an entity or records involved in privatization to determine 
whether they are public in nature, without rejecting access based on 
one narrow factor. In contrast to the state court cases discussed in 
the next section, these courts, which make up the majority, are will-
ing to allow access to the records of a private entity even though cer-
tain factors, such as public funding, possession, and control, may not 
be present. 
B.   The Restrictive Approaches Limiting Access 
 The other twelve states that have dealt with the issue of privati-
zation and public access in their court systems have taken a more 
narrow, or restrictive, approach. These states have focused more on 
one determinative issue in deciding whether or not a private entity 
should be subject to freedom of information laws. While these states 
do not always deny access, they only grant records requests from pri-
vate entities under limited circumstances, which are usually deter-
mined by state statutes. In these states, the courts are usually bound 
to uphold statutory mandates regarding when a private entity and 
its records can be considered public. Arguably, it is easier in these 
states for government agencies to delegate functions to private enti-
ties without being subject to freedom of information laws. 
1.   The Public Funds Approach: Arkansas, Michigan, North 
Dakota, Indiana, South Carolina, and Texas  
 Six states have allowed access to documents of private entities 
only if the requisite level of public funding is present. For example, 
                                                                                                                      
 175. See Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. School Bd. of the Sch. Dist., 521 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1994). 
 176. See id. at 169-70. 
 177. See id. at 170. 
 178. See id. 
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the Arkansas Supreme Court has used this public funds approach. In 
Sebastian County Chapter of the American Red Cross v. Weather-
ford,179 the court held that a private charitable organization was not 
subject to the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act because a one-
dollar-per-year lease with the City of Fort Smith did not qualify as 
support by public funds under the Act.180 The court held that one 
dollar could not be considered wholly or partially supported by pub-
lic funds under the Acts definition of public records, because the 
Arkansas legislature required direct funding to the private entity in 
order for its records to be subject to the Act.181 Although the court 
stated that the Act should be applied liberally, it essentially took a 
plain language approach to the statute by refusing to expand the 
Acts application to entities that receive some sort of public funds no 
matter how minor.182 In other words, the court was restricted to the 
explicit definition of public records under the statute. 
 The Michigan Court of Appeals has also taken a public funds ap-
proach similar to that taken by the Arkansas Supreme Court. In 
Kubick v. Child and Family Services,183 the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals held that a private, nonprofit foster-care corporation was not 
subject to the Michigan Freedom of Information Act because it re-
ceived less than half of its funding from government sources and was 
not a public body under the Act.184 This court also took a plain lan-
guage approach, reasoning that the primarily funded language 
meant that the private entity must by chiefly or principally funded 
by public funds in order for it to be subject to the statute.185 In short, 
                                                                                                                      
 179. 846 S.W.2d 641 (Ark. 1993). 
 180. See id. 
 181. Id. at 643-44. 
 182. Id. at 644; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(1) (Mitchie 1999) (defining public 
records). A previous Arkansas Supreme Court decision had granted access to legal memo-
randa prepared by outside counsel for the City of Fayetteville, holding that outside counsel 
hired by the city were essentially acting as city attorneys and documents prepared by them 
were subject to the Act. See City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 801 S.W.2d 275 (Ark. 1990). 
The court rejected the public funds argument in Edmark because although the outside 
counsel was not the citys regular attorney, the documents were essentially the city gov-
ernments in that they pertained directly to the government. See id. at 278-79. This deci-
sion apparently does not reject the public funds approach, but it instead focuses on the fact 
that an attorneys files belong to the government and thus are not the property of any pri-
vate entity. See id. at 279. Thus, it is not the agencys support by public funds that is 
even relevant in such a case. 
 183. 429 N.W.2d 881 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
 184. See id. 
 185. Id. at 883. The court declined, however, to state exactly how much funding would 
constitute primarily funded through government funds. Id. In an earlier decision, the 
Court of Appeals also favored the actual possession approach, discussed supra. In Hoff-
man v. Bay City Sch. Dist., 357 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984), the court held that be-
cause the document in question was produced and maintained by a private entity, it was 
not in possession of the government and was not a public record under the Act. Id. at 
688-89. The court refused to hold that the school district was in constructive possession of 
its attorneys investigative records, putting it in direct conflict with those state courts that 
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without some unspecified level of public funding, a private entity in 
Michigan will not be subject to the states Freedom of Information 
Act because of its explicit definition, regardless of other factors such 
as the function of entity or control. 
 The North Dakota Supreme Court has used an approach that ren-
ders a private entity subject to access if it is supported by govern-
ment under the statutory language. In a recent case, the court 
stressed that this support by government must be more than mere 
bargained-for consideration or a quid pro quo between the govern-
ment and private agency.186 The court did not consider an exchange 
of goods for services to be support by the government and therefore 
refused to grant access to the documents of Greater North Dakota 
Association, which was essentially an arm of the chamber of com-
merce involved in lobbying and business promotional activities.187 
 Similarly, in Indianapolis Convention & Visitors Association v. 
Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc.,188 the association at issue was a pub-
lic agency under Indianas Access to Public Records Act only because 
it was maintained and supported in whole or part by public funds 
from Marion County.189 The association did not have a fee-for-
services arrangement with the county because it was actually sup-
ported through yearly taxation, county property and equipment 
without cost.190 Without this obligation for yearly county support, the 
association would not have been a public agency under the access 
                                                                                                                      
would take a more flexible approach to what constitutes a public record. Id. at 689. See 
also Part III.A, supra. 
 The Michigan Court of Appeals followed the Kubick approach in the recent decision of 
State Defender Union Employees v. Legal Aid and Defender Assn of Detroit, 584 N.W.2d 
359 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), when it had to decide as an issue of first impression whether an 
organization that received payment from government sources to provide legal services to 
Detroit residents was primarily funded by or through state or local authority under the 
statute. Id. at 360. The court used the plain meaning of the term funded to determine 
that the organization was not a public agency because it merely provided services in ex-
change for a fee. See id. at 362. The court refused to make every entity doing most of its 
business with the government a public body under the statute. See id. 
 186. See Adams County Record v. Greater N. Dakota Assn, 529 N.W.2d 830, 835 (N.D. 
1995). 
 187. See id. The Supreme Court held that summary judgment was inappropriate as 
there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether GNDA is an organization sup-
ported in part by public funds, and thus subject to the open records law. Id. at 831. In fact, 
GNDA was meant to be the voice of business . . . in North Dakota, and it included 10 gov-
ernment agencies as members, solicited government members, and was given state funds 
for certain activities. Id. at 832. However, these wound up being funds for services, as op-
posed to financial support from the government. The court refused to read the support pro-
vision expansively, opting to focus only on public funding to determine whether a private 
entity is subject to the disclosure law. See id. 
 188. 577 N.E.2d 208 (Ind. 1991). 
 189. Id. at 209; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 5-11-1-16(e) (West 1989) (defining public 
agency). 
 190. Indianapolis Newspapers, 577 N.E.2d at 212-13. 
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law.191 Again, the court had a specific, explicit definition of what con-
stitutes a public agency from the Indiana legislature, limiting the 
courts discretion. 
 South Carolinas access law contained language similar to the In-
diana law when the South Carolina Supreme Court held in Weston v. 
Carolina Research & Development Foundation192 that a research and 
development foundation was subject to the states Freedom of Infor-
mation Act because it was supported in whole or in part by public 
funds or expending public funds.193 The foundation had received 
public funds in connection with the sale of public real estate, utilized 
university personnel and a federal grant, directed the expenditure of 
public funds, and retained research monies from university employ-
ees.194 Thus, it had the requisite level of funding to bring it within the 
access laws specific mandate.195 This was because the only way that 
the public can determine with specificity how those funds were spent 
is through access to the records and affairs of the organization receiv-
ing and spending the funds.196 However, the opinion makes clear 
that only support by public funds will subject a private entity to the 
states freedom of information law because of the statutes explicit 
language. 
 Lastly, two Texas courts have used the public funds approach. 
The Texas Court of Appeals in Dallas has held that public funds are 
needed to subject a private entity to the Texas Open Records Act, and 
that private schools do not receive the requisite support from public 
funds.197 Instead, private schools receive private monies, therefore 
they are not subject to the Act since they are not supported in whole 
or in part by public funds or expend[] public funds.198 In a recent de-
cision, the Texas Court of Appeals in Waco held in Blankenship v. 
Brazos Higher Education Authority, Inc.199 that a higher education 
authority was not a governmental body because it received no fund-
ing from a state governmental entity, but that it was instead pri-
vately engaged in issuing revenue bonds to purchase student loans.200 
                                                                                                                      
 191. See id. at 214. 
 192. 401 S.E.2d 161 (S.C. 1991). 
 193. Id. at 163; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(a) (Supp. 1989) (defining public re-
cord). 
 194. See Weston, 401 S.E.2d at 163-64. 
 195. In fact, the Weston court stated that the receipt of any public funds would bring 
an entity within the state access law. See id. at 164. Thus, its public funds approach was 
somewhat broader than the other states that required a requisite level of funds. 
 196. Id. at 165. 
 197. See A.H. Belo Corp. v. Southern Methodist Univ., 734 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex. App. 
1987). 
 198. Id. at 723; see also TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 3 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000) (defining 
governmental body). 
 199. 975 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App. 1998).  
 200. Id. at 363-64. 
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Because the two courts had a clear statutory mandate, they were 
only concerned with the necessary public funds in determining 
whether the private entity should be subject to public access. Like 
the other five states stressing funding, the Texas courts were only 
concerned with the necessary public funds in determining whether 
the private entity should be subject to public access because it had a 
clear statutory mandate.201 
2.   The Prior Legal Determination Approach: Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, New Jersey, and West Virginia  
 Four states use a restrictive approach limiting access to cases 
where the private entity was created by the legislature or in some 
way previously determined by law to be subject to freedom of infor-
mation laws.202 For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held 
in Community College v. Brown,203 that a community college was not 
an agency within the meaning of the states Right to Know Act be-
cause it was not created by statute or pursuant to a statute making 
the colleges activities an essential government function.204 The court 
held that the community college must perform an essential govern-
ment function as defined by statute or constitutional mandate, or it 
must perform a function vital to the continued existence of the 
state.205 The functions of community colleges were not essential be-
cause they were not mandated by statute or the constitution, and the 
state would not be put in jeopardy in absence of community col-
leges.206 In short, there had been no previous legal determination 
                                                                                                                      
 201. At least one commentator has nonetheless feared that Texas private entities are 
still susceptible to the Texas Open Records Act. See generally Byron C. Keeling, Attempt-
ing to Keep the Tablets Undisclosed: Susceptibility of Private Entities to the Texas Open Re-
cords Act, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 203 (1989). The author suggests that the Act was absolutely 
not meant to reach private entities, but has nonetheless been construed to reach private 
entities by attorneys general in that state, and that any amount of public funding will sub-
ject the private entity to the Act. See id. at 215. Nonetheless, this Article suggests that the 
Texas approach would actually be more protective of private entities and less favorable to 
access than the approach taken by many other states. 
 202. This section includes cases where the law had previously determined that a cer-
tain entity should be subject to the access laws. This includes cases where a legislative de-
termination makes the entity public, or where the state constitution labels the entity or 
the entitys function as subject to public access. Like the other restrictive approaches, it 
can be said that this approach limits judicial discretion because there already has been a 
previous mandate subjecting the entity to access. 
 203. 674 A.2d 670, 671 (Pa. 1996). 
 204. See id. at 671; see also 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 66.1(1) (1996). 
 205. See Community College, 674 A.2d at 671. The vital function language suggests a 
function that is constitutionally guaranteed or essential for survival, thus it really adds no 
flexibility to the legislative determination approach. See id. at 672 n.4 (discussing diction-
ary definition of the word essential as something indispensable or fundamental). 
 206. Id. at 671-72. 
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that community colleges should be subject to public access, particu-
larly from the state legislature or constitution.207 
 The Tennessee Court of Appeals has also held that a private en-
tity is not subject to the Public Records Act unless it is previously de-
termined to be open by legislative determination or other law. In 
Memphis Publishing Co. v. Shelby County Health Care Corp.,208 the 
court held that a hospital operated by a not-for-profit corporation was 
a private hospital rather than a governmental entity because the 
corporation did not originate in the General Assembly, but was in-
stead incorporated as a private corporation.209 The corporation oper-
ated in a similar fashion to any other private corporation, even 
though it was arguably being operated for a public purpose.210 In 
other words, neither legislative determination nor another law had 
operated to transform the hospital into a public entity, regardless of 
the corporations functions.211 
 New Jersey and West Virginia courts have also developed a form 
of the prior legal determination approach. In Keddie v. Rutgers State 
University,212 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that legal docu-
ments in the possession of Rutgers University were not public re-
cords under the states Right-to-Know Law because they were not 
explicitly required to be made, maintained or kept on file by Rut-
gers.213 New Jersey law did not require the documents to be kept on 
file to satisfy auditors; thus, they were not right-to-know docu-
                                                                                                                      
 207. See id.; see also Mooney v. Bd. of Trustees, 292 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1972). Mooney held 
that the legislature did not alter the status of a private university (Temple) by increasing 
state funding. See id. at 400-01. The university was not a state agency under the Inspec-
tion and Copying Records Act because it did not meet the statutory requirement of being a 
State or municipal authority or similar organization. Id. at 398. The state had declared 
that Temple would remain a nonprofit corporation chartered for educational purposes and 
not a state agency. See id. at 400. Thus, there had been a legal determination that the uni-
versity was private. Cf. Sapp Roofing Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Intl Assn Local 12, 713 
A.2d 627 (Pa. 1998). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a union could access wage 
information on a government contractors employees under the Right to Know Act because 
the records directly related to the expenditure of public funds to pay private employees, 
and they were part of the school districts decision-making function. See id. at 629. Most 
importantly, they were required to be kept by the contractor under a specific statute, the 
Prevailing Wage Act. See id. at 630. Therefore, the union was empowered to access the re-
cords by a specific statute. 
 208. 799 S.W.2d 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 209. See id. at 229. 
 210. See id. at 229-30. 
 211. Additionally, the corporation was not immune from tort liability, and it was not 
controlled by the state or formally delegated functions of the government. See id. at 229. 
But see Creative Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 795 S.W.2d 672, 678-79 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1990) (holding that subleases in the possession of a city attorney were public re-
cords because they were records of the citys leasing agent under contract, creating a legal 
principal-and-agent relationship between the city and the private entity). The fact that the 
documents were in the city attorneys hands was irrelevant in Creative Restaurants be-
cause the attorney was also the citys agent. See id. 
 212. 689 A.2d 702 (N.J. 1997). 
 213. Id. at 704 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47-1A-2 (1997)). 
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ments.214 Lastly, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held 
in Four-H Road Community Association v. West Virginia University 
Foundation, Inc.215 that a private nonprofit corporation formed under 
general corporation law for assisting university fund raising was not 
subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act because it 
was neither created nor funded by a state authority.216 There was no 
legislative mandate for the entitys creation. As a result, it was the 
same as any other corporation in the state.217 Like the other three 
states, there was no legal determination that the private entity was 
subject to access; and therefore, judicial discretion was limited. 
3.  The Possession Approach: Iowa  
 The Iowa Supreme Court has taken an approach limiting access to 
documents in public entity possession. In City of Dubuque v. Du-
buque Racing Association,218 the court held that a private nonprofit 
racing association was not subject to access, even though the city 
participated on the associations board of directors.219 The documents 
were neither produced nor originated by the government, nor were 
they held by public officers in their official capacity.220 The court, 
therefore, took an official capacity approach mandated by the access 
statute, limiting public access to those cases where the documents 
are in the lawful possession of the public entity.221 Simply because 
city officials participated on the racing associations board did not 
turn the associations business into government business. Accord-
ingly, the documents were not held by the board officials in their offi-
cial capacity.222 In short, no official business was involved and the 
meeting minutes were not held by public officials under the statutory 
mandate.223 
                                                                                                                      
 214. Id. at 708. However, the court held that the documents were public under common 
law because they were publicly created, and because Rutgers asserted no claim of confiden-
tiality and could not outweigh the individuals interest in disclosure. See id. at 709-711. 
 215. 388 S.E.2d 308 (W. Va. 1989). 
 216. See id. at 312-13. The statute at issue in this case defined public body as an en-
tity created or primarily funded by the government. See W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-2(3) (1997). 
However, the court in this case seemed to focus on the created by state authority issue, 
bringing it within the legal determination line of cases. Four-H Road Community Assn, 
388 S.E.2d at 310. 
 217. See Four-H Road Community Assn, 388 S.E.2d at 311-12. 
 218. 420 N.W.2d 450 (Iowa 1988). 
 219. See id. at 453. 
 220. Id. at 452. 
 221. See id. 
 222. See id. at 452-53. 
 223. See id.; see also KMEG Television, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 440 N.W.2d 
382, 385 (Iowa 1989) (holding that the plain meaning of the statute meant that records not 
shared with the university were not public records because the records had nothing to do 
with public officials acting in their official capacity). The Iowa approach differs from the 
flexible approach that relies on the nature of records described in Part III.A.3 supra be-
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4.   The Public Control Approach: Illinois  
 The fourth restrictive approach, used by an Illinois appellate 
court, limits access to cases in which the private entity is effectively 
controlled by a public agency. In Hopf v. Topcorp, Inc.,224 an Illinois 
appellate court held that two corporations were not sufficiently con-
trolled by the City of Evanston to render them liable under the state 
Freedom of Information Act.225 The two private corporations, created 
and hired to develop a research park for the city and Northwestern 
University, were not subsidiary bodies of the government under the 
statutory language and were not public bodies under the Act.226 The 
City and Northwestern owned shares in the corporations, were enti-
tled to appoint members to their respective boards, and had contrib-
uted funds for the research park development.227 Additionally, the 
citys involvement in the project had previously been the subject of 
public debate.228 However, because the two corporations functioned 
independently of direct government control, they were not public bod-
ies under the Act.229 Instead, because the city was unable to control 
the decision-making process of the corporations (even with board 
representation and fifty-percent public funding), the corporations 
were not under the direct public control that the statute required in 
order to make them subject to access.230 The court thus focused on 
one factor in denying access, an approach that can be classified as re-
strictive and is determined at least somewhat by legislative defini-
tions. 
                                                                                                                      
cause Iowa seems to require some sort of physical possession of the records under the stat-
ute, regardless of the subject matter of the records. See id. at 385. However, the nature of 
the records could still be important in Iowa, because the court seems to suggest that if gov-
ernment business is substantially intertwined with the private entity, the records will be 
in the lawful possession of the government. See id. This could probably be termed a kind of 
constructive possession. The Iowa approach is placed in its own restrictive category be-
cause it seems to require some physical or constructive possession under the statute, 
whereas the flexible courts are not as statutorily restricted and simply require government 
subject matter. 
 224. 628 N.E.2d 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
 225. See id. at 317. 
 226. Id. at 313, 317. 
 227. See id. at 316-17. 
 228. See id. at 314. 
 229. See id. at 317. 
 230. It should be noted that the court mentioned three factors to be used in determin-
ing whether a private entity is subject to the Freedom of Information Act: independent ex-
istence, the nature of the functions performed by the private entity, and the degree of gov-
ernment control. See id. at 314-15. However, the court still followed a public control ap-
proach because it ignored the fact that 50% of the corporations funds came from the pub-
lic. See id. This public control approach diverges from the traditional totality of factors ap-
proach. 
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C.   A Comparison of the Approaches 
 The seven approaches taken by the thirty-four states analyzed in 
this Article vary in terms of the relative ease of gaining access to pri-
vate entities records. The approaches are classified under the broad 
headings flexible and restrictive, but the state courts under each 
sub-category differ in the scope of their inquiry when compared to 
the states in other sub-categories. For example, it can be argued that 
the ten states classified under the public function approach are more 
flexible than the six states falling into the totality of factors category. 
This is because while the public function courts look only at the na-
ture of the private entitys function, the totality of factors courts re-
quire the presence of a variety of factors in order to subject a private 
entity to freedom of information laws, and one factor alone is not de-
terminative.231 The public function states, therefore, conduct a 
broader inquiry instead of a fact-based analysis. 
 Similarly, some state courts in the restrictive categories are more 
restrictive than others because they are more constrained by explicit 
statutory language, such as the requirement of a requisite level of 
public funding. Other state courts can interpret the determinative 
factor more broadly, such as what constitutes public control. 
 Arguably, the nature of records approach described in Part III.A.3 
is the most flexible approach used by all states discussed herein be-
cause it does not require any enumerated factors for access. This ap-
proach makes it almost inevitable that a private entitys documents 
will be accessible by the public, provided the documents relate to the 
government in some way and regardless of other factors. Courts us-
ing the nature of records approach focus on the documents them-
selves instead of the entity. If the documents have relevance to gov-
ernment, they should be accessible to the public because they allow 
the public to discover what its government is doing.232 
 The nature of records courts do more than just give lip service to 
the notion that governments should not be able to violate the purpose 
behind freedom of information laws by contracting out to private en-
tities.233 The six states using the nature of records approach
Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Washington and Wisconsin
are thus the only states that truly allow access to records because 
they disclose government actions. The issue is not about privatiza-
tion or the nature of the entities involved when one is seeking access 
in these states. Instead, the issue becomes one of the most crucial 
                                                                                                                      
 231. For example, compare the totality of factors approach in Florida, supra Part 
III.A.1, with Georgias public function approach, supra Part III.A.2. 
 232. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 233. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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reasons for freedom of information: the publics right to know what 
its government is doing. 
 Unless courts recognize that public documents belong to the pub-
lic, regardless of who physically possesses them, they are violating 
one of the essential spirits of access laws. For example, documents 
regarding a government settlement should be public even if some 
private entity possesses them. If a majority of courts viewed the pri-
vatization issue from a nature of records perspective, there would be 
no need to fear the growing privatization movement from a public ac-
cess standpoint because of the courts broad analysis regarding what 
constitutes a public record. 
 The restrictive approaches limit access because, under these ap-
proaches, state courts look to only one factor to determine whether a 
private entity should be subject to public access. Among the four re-
strictive approaches, the prior legal determination and possession 
approaches probably have the most potential for circumventing free-
dom of information through privatization. When courts require pub-
lic entities to actually possess the documents, or require a prior legal 
determination granting access, the courts essentially allow govern-
ments to use privatization to circumvent the publics right to know. 
Governments in these restrictive states can contract their services to 
private entities that will then have little access responsibility unless 
the government retains possession of the documents or the law es-
sentially requires access.234 In privatization contexts where the gov-
ernment intends to circumvent access, it is hard to imagine that ei-
ther possession or the law would protect the publics right to know. 
 The prior legal determination and possession approaches are 
therefore even more restrictive than either the public funds or public 
control approaches because they rely more heavily on specific, ex-
plicit statutory provisions. Conversely, under either the public funds 
or the public control approach, at least some courts seem willing to 
allow access in a variety of cases, interpreting the statutory man-
dates fairly broadly under some circumstances. For example, some 
courts may allow access to a private entity if it is given any public 
funds or if it is subjected to marginal public control.235 While these 
approaches are restrictive, as they tend to limit access to cases where 
a specific factor is present, it can be argued that in many privatiza-
                                                                                                                      
 234. See supra Part III.B.2-3. 
 235. See supra Part III.B.1, -B.4. Arguably, Illinois approach (described in Part III.B.4) 
is restrictive because it ignores the public entitys involvement in the private corporation. 
However, as the Hopf court suggested, if the city exhibited some sort of decision-making or 
other authority that rendered the corporations existence dependent on the government, 
the corporations would have been subject to the Freedom of Information Act. In short, the 
public control approach could be less restrictive than other approaches as long as some de-
gree of requisite control is present, a situation that may not be very uncommon in privati-
zation situations. 
2000]                        THE PUBLICS RIGHT TO KNOW 863 
 
tion cases, at least some degree of public funds or control will be in-
volved. If courts are willing to allow access based on the minimal 
presence of these factors, then the public funds and public control 
approaches may be less harmful to access than the approaches that 
require a particular legal mandate or possession. Only in cases of 
complete privatization, which are fairly rare,236 would the govern-
ment be able to escape access requirements by completely turning 
over its operations to a private entity. Contracting out is the more 
common form of privatization;237 thus, these two approaches may 
pose less of a threat to the publics right to know than it would ini-
tially seem. 
 In short, one can envisage a scale of approaches based on the de-
gree of public access to private entity records, from most favorable to 
least favorable. This scale, with 1 being the most favorable to public 
access and 7 being the least favorable, would give the practitioner 
and public an idea of which states are most likely to grant access in 
the face of privatization, and which states are likely to allow the gov-
ernment to privatize with little resulting responsibility on the part of 
private entities to provide access to records:238 
 1. The nature of records approach (six states)allowing ac-
cess as long as the records pertain to some aspect of government; 
 2. The public function approach (ten states)allowing access 
when the private entity is performing a government function; 
 3. The totality of factors approach (six states)allowing ac-
cess as long as the presence of certain factors outweighs the ab-
sence of other factors (such as public funding, control, independ-
ence, etc.); 
 4. The public funds approach (six states)limiting access to 
those cases where the requisite level of public funding is present; 
 5. The public control approach (one state)limiting access to 
those cases where the requisite level of government control is pre-
sent; 
 6. The possession approach (one state)limiting access to 
those cases where the public entity is in possession of the docu-
ments; 
                                                                                                                      
 236. See supra Part II for a description of the various forms of privatization. 
 237. See id. 
 238. Again, note that only thirty-four states have dealt with the issue of privatization 
and public access to private entities. Therefore, sixteen states have yet to adopt one of the 
approaches described in this Article; indeed, those sixteen states could invent their own 
approaches. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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 7. The prior legal determination approach (four states)
limiting access to those cases where there has been a legal deter-
mination that the entity should be subject to access (i.e., statutory 
or constitutional). 
 This scale assists in determining where in the United States pri-
vatization most drastically impacts public access. By categorizing the 
thirty-four states that have reached the privatization issue, it is pos-
sible for the media lawyer, the practicing media professional, and the 
public to better understand how contracting out can effectively close 
the door on access, and in what parts of the country that door is 
locked the tightest. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this Article is to provide a useful categorization for 
determining where in the United States privatization is having the 
most dramatic impact on public access, as well as to determine which 
states are most likely to uphold the publics right to know in the face 
of privatization. Privatization has been a continuing trend since the 
1980s. Each year, privatization affects many services traditionally 
performed in the open, from fire protection to university operations. 
Until fairly recently, however, the access to government information 
issue had not taken center stage in the privatization debate. An es-
sential goal of this Article is to highlight the effects privatization ac-
tually has on access to information that was once public. 
 Although all fifty states have statutes protecting the publics right 
to know, many state courts must determine the reach of these stat-
utes with respect to private entities because state legislatures have 
failed to amend their laws in the face of privatization. In many 
states, statutory definitions explicitly determine when an entity and 
its records are public, but in other states the courts have some dis-
cretion to interpret the statutes in a flexible or restrictive manner. 
This is because when most states drafted statutes to protect the pub-
lics right of access to public information, the respective legislatures 
may not have contemplated the growing privatization trend. It is 
now up to the courts, in the absence of legislative action, to contem-
plate this trend and protect the spirit of openness. This Article is 
meant to provide information regarding how the state courts are 
dealing with this growing phenomenon as of early 1999. Vigorous 
public and legal debate over the effect of privatization should con-
tinue, lest the freedom of information laws develop huge loopholes for 
governments to jump through in this new millennium. 
